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ARTICLE

ADVOCACY REVALUED

†

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DANA A. REMUS

††

A central and ongoing debate among legal ethics scholars addresses the moral positioning of adversarial advocacy. Most participants in this debate focus on
the structure of our legal system and the constituent role of the lawyer-advocate.
Many are highly critical, arguing that the core structure of adversarial advocacy
is the root cause of many instances of lawyer misconduct. In this Article, we argue that these scholars’ focuses are misguided. Through reflection on Aristotle’s
treatise, Rhetoric, we defend advocacy in our legal system’s litigation process as
ethically positive and as pivotal to fair and effective dispute resolution. We recognize that advocacy can, and sometimes does, involve improper and unethical
use of adversarial techniques, but we demonstrate that these are problems of practice and not of structure and should be addressed as such.
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INTRODUCTION
A central and ongoing debate in legal ethics scholarship addresses
the moral positioning of adversarial advocacy. Professor Daniel Markovits brought renewed attention to this debate in his book, A Modern
1
Legal Ethics. With rhetorical flair, the book opens by asserting that
professional obligations for lawyers to act in unethical ways—to “lie”
and to “cheat”—“are deeply ingrained in the genetic structure of ad2
versary advocacy.”
Other scholars have made similar allegations. They, too, have located the problems and deficiencies of advocacy within the structure
of our system. They, too, have argued that core principles of adversarial ethics, including the duties of loyalty and confidentiality, are the
3
root cause of unethical lawyer conduct.
Many scholars who have taken this position go on to argue that
given the problem’s deep foundation in the structure of our system, it
cannot be addressed through the extrinsic controls of the law governing lawyers; it can be remedied only through the intrinsic moral conditioning of lawyers. The solution, these critics conclude, is to redefine the role of the lawyer-advocate to include direct responsibilities
4
for truth and justice. Proposals along these lines are numerous.
1

DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008).
Id. at 2-4.
3
For examples of such arguments, see infra note 4; see also MARKOVITS, supra note
1, at 5 (“Fidelity, understood as a distinctively lawyerly virtue, offers lawyers their best
hope for ethical vindication of their professional lives.”).
4
See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 79-80, 83 (1980) (describing a
report by “a commission of the American Bar Association” (for which one of us served
as the reporter) that “considered, but did not adopt, a provision requiring the disclosure of facts known to the lawyer which ‘would probably have a substantial effect on
the determination of a material issue’” (internal quotation marks omitted)); ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 154 (1993) (“A legal education must do more than
impart information and technical skills. It must also inculcate the character-virtues of
prudence and public-spiritedness.”); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 138
(1998) (arguing that lawyers can defer to both “justice” and the existing legal frame2
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Judge Marvin Frankel once suggested that “the paramount commitment of counsel concerning matters of fact should be to the discovery
5
of truth rather than to the advancement of the client’s interest.” Professor William Simon proposed a “basic maxim” that lawyers “take such
actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular
6
case, seem likely to promote justice.” Professor David Luban proposed that lawyers be held “morally accountable for what they do on
7
behalf of clients and what outcomes they further.” And Professor Anthony Kronman suggested redefining the lawyer-advocate’s role as that
of a civic-minded “lawyer-statesman,” who would advise clients as to the
8
course of action that was not only legal, but prudent and wise as well —
a position that might be consistent with some forms of adversarial advocacy but would not be with others. These and other proposals are
unified by two common but problematic conclusions: the adversarial
system is to blame for problems of lawyer misconduct, and the proper
solution lies in improving the internal moral constraints of lawyers.
In the initial passages of A Modern Legal Ethics, Professor Markovits
appears to locate the problems of advocacy in the requirements that
advocacy imposes on lawyers as moral agents. In doing so, he suggests
9
potential agreement with the views and premises of these proposals.

work); Robert Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015,
1031-35 (1981) (discussing the costs and benefits of adopting attorney disclosure rules
and suggesting the benefits of “third-party disclosure obligations governed by a negligence standard”); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1056 (1975) (“We may want to ask . . . whether it would be an excessive
price for the client to be stuck with the truth rather than having counsel allied with
him for concealment and distortion. The full development of this thought is beyond
my studies to date. Its implications may be unacceptable. I only urge that it is among
the premises in need of examination.”).
5
Frankel, supra note 4, at 1055; see also id. at 1057 (“The rules of professional responsibility should compel disclosures of material facts and forbid material omissions
rather than merely proscribe positive frauds.”).
6
SIMON, supra note 4, at 9.
7
David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2008).
8
KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 14, 147-55. Existing professional rules permit, and
competent representation requires, such counseling. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
9
In outlining his argument, Markovits explains:
First, lawyers’ professional obligations to behave in ways that would ordinarily
be immoral are not simply the results of excessive or perverse partisanship.
Instead, they are deeply ingrained in the genetic structure of adversary advo-
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As the book continues, however, he takes a different approach. He
disclaims advocacy’s truth-finding function and argues that advocacy
must be understood and evaluated not against the first-person morality of the lawyer but instead against the goal of political legitimacy. In
this light, he contends, conduct that would otherwise be called lying
10
and cheating is rendered far less problematic.
In this Article, we support and advance an approach to evaluate
the role of the advocate by reference to a political need for authoritative dispute resolution. But we disagree that lawyers’ actions, if undertaken in accordance with the standard rules governing advocacy, can
or should be described as “lying” or “cheating.” Both characterizations imply an access to ultimate truth, which all players in the legal
system lack. Professor Markovits’s comments in this regard may be in11
tended as rhetorical flourish, but they are nevertheless problematic

cacy. . . . Second, while it may be that lawyers’ professional obligations to act
in ordinarily immoral ways are necessary parts of a moral division of labor that
best serves justice overall, this is not enough to redeem their professional ethics. . . . And third, an alternative approach to legal ethics, which develops an
account of distinctively lawyerly virtue to complement division of labor arguments, can render lawyers’ lives ethically appealing and so bring their professional ethics to a successful conclusion.
MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 2. He also acknowledges that “although this vindication is
possible in principle, recent developments in the structure of the legal profession
threaten to deny contemporary lawyers practical access to the ideals on which it depends.” Id. at 2-3.
10
See id. at 171 (“doubt[ing] whether integrity-preserving role-based redescription
is ultimately of much practical use to modern lawyers”). Professor Markovits’s approach of evaluating the role of the advocate by reference to the exigencies of practical government has recently been embraced by others as well. See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE
COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S
ROLE 148 (2009) (responding to the argument that lawyers cannot “properly avoid
moral censure by appeal to a distinct institutional morality” by arguing instead that
“lawyers have moral grounds for regarding themselves as having duties to their clients
which may allow or require them to act in ways which would be immoral were they acting outside of their professional roles” (emphasis omitted)); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal
Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 72 (2005) (“Lawyers
may not treat the law instrumentally, as an obstacle to be planned around, but must
treat legal norms as legitimate reasons for action in their practical deliberation.”); W.
Bradley Wendel, Moral Judgment and Professional Legitimation, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1071,
1073 (2007) (“Legal ethics differs in kind from ordinary ethics because the social function of the law is to settle normative disagreement procedurally and to adopt a provisional social settlement of moral conflict that precludes acting on the basis of ordinary
first-order moral reasons.”).
11
We note that later in his book, Professor Markovits appears to accept that lawyers’ actions should be understood not as lying and cheating but as means of facilitating a truth that is “good enough” to allow government to function. MARKOVITS, supra
note 1, at 171-73, 188-93.
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in two ways. First, they send the unfortunate message that law students’ future line of work entails and requires dishonesty. Second,
they obscure the pivotal and ethically positive role of advocacy in the
authoritative resolution of disputes in our legal system.
In developing our argument, we draw on several insights from
12
Aristotle’s treatise, Rhetoric. We find Aristotle’s analysis relevant and
useful for two reasons. First, Aristotle responds to Plato’s criticism, le13
veled in the Gorgias, that rhetoric is per se unethical. The arguments
14
of many contemporary critics echo those of Plato, such that Aristotle’s defense is philosophically apposite. Second, Rhetoric offers a
15
critical perspective that, until recently, has been wanting in contemporary debate—namely that the role and function of advocacy must
16
be understood by reference to its social context. Aristotle identifies
two defining features of this context in ancient Athens, which are
equally relevant today: the inherent uncertainty in human knowledge
12

ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, reprinted in THE RHETORIC AND THE POETICS OF ARIS2 (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., Random House, Modern Library
College ed. 1984).
13
As Aristotle wrote, “if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all
good things except virtue, and above all against things that are most useful.” Id. bk. I,
ch. 1, at 1355b. See also PLATO, GORGIAS 463 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books
1971) [hereinafter PLATO, GORGIAS] (“[W]hat I [Socrates] call oratory is a branch of
something which certainly isn’t a fine or honourable pursuit.”). We note, however, that
in the Gorgias, Socrates concedes the possibility of positive use of rhetoric, and in the
Phaedrus, he presents the possibility of a positive moral standing for rhetoric. See id. at
504 (“[T]he good orator, being also a man of knowledge, will have [righteousness and
moderation] in view in any speech or action by which he seeks to influence the souls of
men . . . .”); PLATO, PHAEDRUS 274B (R. Hackforth trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1952)
(stating that “the art of speech” includes “both the true art and the false”).
14
Plato’s criticism was twofold. First, he argued that rhetoric lacked its own subject matter and allowed a speaker to persuade anyone about anything. As a result, it
was not a socially valuable art worthy of study but a mere “knack” for persuasion
through “gratification and pleasure.” PLATO, GORGIAS, supra note 13, at 462. Second,
Plato argued that rhetoric prioritized flattery of an audience over truth-finding. See id.
at 466 (suggesting, through Socrates, that oratory is “a branch of pandering”). Many
critics echo, or even explicitly cite, these arguments. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman,
Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 959 (1981).
15
See supra note 10.
16
Aristotle accepted Plato’s premise that rhetoric allows a speaker to persuade
anyone about anything and that it can therefore have application in virtually any interpersonal setting. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355b (“It is clear,
then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as
universal as dialectic . . . .”). We question the need for this concession. As we explain
below, Aristotle demonstrates that rhetoric is necessarily constrained by two defining
aspects of its context, see infra Section I.A, which means that rhetoric’s application is
not truly limitless.
TOTLE
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and affairs, and the social necessity for political action notwithstand17
ing that uncertainty. Aristotle’s insights in this regard provide the
basis for an effective response to the critics who contend that the
problems and difficulties of advocacy are inevitable features of our legal system’s core structure.
We begin our analysis in Part I by applying Aristotle’s insights to
our adversarial system. In doing so, we address a simplified model of
advocacy. We speak of advocacy in our legal system’s litigation process
18
and not in negotiation or transactional work. Within the domain of
litigation, we address advocates who act within the bounds of the law
and ethics governing lawyers. This simplified model has a limited resemblance to actual practice, but it allows for useful isolation of advocacy’s legitimate and central function in our legal system. This function, which many critics fail to appreciate, is to facilitate construction
of an accepted and authoritative version of truth upon which disputes
can be resolved and justice administered.
In Part II, we turn from the core function of advocacy to its actual
practice. We recognize that advocacy is sometimes employed in improper ways and to improper ends, but we argue that in our legal system, these problems reside outside the core structure of adjudication
and the authorized role of the advocate. We therefore reject the suggestion of many critics that the problems of advocacy are properly addressed by reconstituting our legal system. We believe that solutions
are better sought in the rules of procedure and evidence and in the
law governing lawyers. We leave the task of formulating specific
reform proposals for future work, but we argue that it is through ex-

17

See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1357a (“Most of the things about
which we make decisions . . . present us with alternative possibilities. . . . [C]onclusions
that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the
same . . . .”).
18
Some of the critiques that we address approach the role of advocates in common law systems as a single category, to be contrasted with the role of lawyers in civil
law systems. We find this approach problematic for two reasons. First, the relationship
between truth and the role of the advocate does not appear to correspond to differences between common law and civil law systems. The formal definition of “legal
counselor” does not differ substantially between civil law and common law systems; in
fact, actual fulfillment of the role is much more strongly influenced by a regime’s ambient political culture, legal institutions, and social ethos than by its common law or
civil law structure. Second, the advocate’s role cannot and should not be abstracted
from the institutions, practices, and norms of a specific regime. Accordingly, we address the practice of advocacy and the role of the lawyer-advocate in our contemporary
legal system. This becomes particularly important in subsection I.B.2 as we address the
details of our litigation process.
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trinsic regulatory controls that the moral risk of the advocate’s function can be set at an acceptable and desirable level.
I. IN DEFENSE OF ADVOCACY’S VALUE
In Rhetoric, Aristotle addresses two principal settings in which rhetoric was employed in ancient Athens. One is the forensic setting of the
law courts; a second is the legislative setting of the deliberative assem19
bly. Both are characterized by two defining features: the inherent uncertainty of available information and the social necessity for public de20
cision and action. In this Part, we describe these features and the
challenges to which they give rise. We then argue that advocacy in our
contemporary legal system should be understood and analyzed as a distinctive and necessary means of coping with these challenges.
A. Understanding Advocacy in Context
1. Ancient Athens
At the heart of Aristotle’s explanation of the practice of rhetoric
lies his distinction between two types of human knowledge—the
21
theoretical and the practical. Theoretical knowledge, which is pursued through a form of analysis and communication called “dialectic,” is knowledge of metaphysics, mathematics, and the natural
22
sciences. It gives rise to truths of the highest kind, absolute and
23
universal truths about the world, called “demonstration[s].” Practical knowledge, in contrast, is pursued through a form of analysis

19

ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 3, at 1358b. A third context discussed by
Aristotle, but not relevant to our current analysis, is hortatory speech in praise of an
honoree. Id. A fourth context, not addressed by Aristotle but relevant today, is appeals to the electorate.
20
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, ch. 2, at 1139a, ch. 3, at 1139b, ch. 5,
at 1140a, ch. 7, at 1141a–b (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall 1999) (discussing practical and theoretical wisdom); see also JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND:
‘PHRONESIS’ AND ‘TECHNE’ IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND IN ARISTOTLE 237-74 (1993)
(examining the distinctions that Aristotle makes between the two types of knowledge).
22
ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. VI, ch. 7, at 1141a–b; see also ARISTOTLE, supra
note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1354a (“Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.”).
23
ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, reprinted in PRIOR ANALYTICS AND POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 75, 76 (A.J. Jenkinson & G.R.G. Mure trans., Digireads.com 2006);
see also Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration, 14 PHRONESIS 123, 123-24
(1969) (explaining Aristotle’s meaning of a “demonstration”). The Pythagorean
theorem is the classic example of a demonstration.
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and communication called “rhetoric”—what we would today call advocacy. It is a much less secure form of knowledge, which consists of
information that individuals acquire and use in living, producing,
and interacting. It is the knowledge of ethics, politics, and human
24
life generally. As opposed to the certainty of theoretical knowledge,
practical knowledge is contingent and contextual. In Aristotle’s
25
words, it is at best “approximately” true.
The challenges of practical knowledge identified by Aristotle give
rise to the central difficulty of human action. An individual contemplating action can often make a reasonably accurate assessment of
surrounding circumstances, but the dynamic and contingent nature of
human life precludes anything approaching the certainty of a theoretical “demonstration.” Circumstances are always subject to change, information is always incomplete, and human action is always enveloped
in some degree of uncertainty.
In the law courts and the deliberative assembly of ancient Athens,
members of the polis confronted these challenges of practical knowledge. Sitting as judge and jury, they had to decide an accused’s guilt
or innocence in the face of conflicting evidence, such as in the famous
26
trial of Socrates. Sitting as a legislative body, they had to make public
policy decisions, such as whether to proceed to war or to rely on dip27
lomacy, in the face of conflicting intelligence and recommendations.
Aristotle explains that these and similar situations demand decision and action as a matter of community necessity. Decisions regarding guilt and innocence, and right and wrong, need to be made lest a
dispute’s disruptive effects persist between parties and in the commu28
nity at large. Decisions regarding matters of war and peace and other matters of public policy need to be made lest the community fall
into confusion and defeat. These decisions are unavoidable, for “the
most essential of all . . . [is] a method of arriving at decisions about
matters of expedience and justice as between one person and anoth-

24

ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. VI, ch. 8, at 1141b. Practical knowledge encompasses both practical wisdom, which is concerned with deliberation, choice, and action,
and techne or art, which is concerned with creation and production. For a more thorough description, see DUNNE, supra note 21, at 237.
25
ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a.
26
See id. ch. 3, at 1358b (explaining how rhetoric is used in the judicial context).
27
See id. (explaining how rhetoric is used in the political context).
28
See AESCHYLUS, THE LIBATION BEARERS 60-69, in THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS 75
(Edward Wright Harle trans., Univ. Press of Am. 1994) (discussing Orestes’s submission to judgment for the murder of his mother at Apollo’s request).
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29

er.” At the same time, these decisions can be extremely difficult.
Their consequences and implications always will depend on a multitude of unknown and unknowable factors, and they must be made on
30
the basis of knowledge that is at best “approximately” true.
Aristotle explains that rhetoric, which “exists to affect the giving
31
of decisions,” aids with this difficulty. Rhetoric mediates the epistemological and moral difficulties of human action and decision in
the face of uncertainty. Significantly, it is only by understanding rhetoric’s social context that we can recognize this function. It is also
only by understanding rhetoric’s social context that we can comprehend the distinctive means by which it fulfills this function. As we
discuss below, these distinctive means necessarily diverge from the
objective and disinterested analysis that would be appropriate in a dialectical pursuit of objective truth.
2. Our Litigation System
Many accounts of modern advocacy fail to recognize or account
for the fact that the two defining features of rhetoric’s ancient context—uncertainty and social necessity for decision—are equally salient
in our contemporary legal system. Instead, both positive and negative
accounts of contemporary adversarial advocacy often assume the accessibility of objective truth in the litigation process. Sanguine proponents of our system argue that competition between partisan advocates is the most effective way of ensuring that the objective truth of a
32
dispute will emerge. Critics, meanwhile, contend that advocacy pays
insufficient respect to, and may even obstruct realization of, objective
33
truth. For example, Professor Simon criticizes the “dominant view”
29

ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. VII, ch. 8, at 1328b (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T.A.
Sinclair trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1992).
30
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31
ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 15, at 1377b.
32
These proponents contend that advocates’ responsibilities to investigate, discover, and present all relevant facts equip a tribunal to piece together the truth of a
legal dispute. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 2.10 (3d ed. 2004) (“Our constitutional adversary system is based in
part on the premise that the adversary system is more effective in the search for
truth.”); E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1141-43 (1973) (explaining why “adversary
role structure seems most congruent with a public policy requiring overwhelming
proof before a verdict can be rendered”).
33
See Frankel, supra note 4, at 1032 (“[O]ur adversary system rates truth too low
among the values that institutions of justice are meant to serve.”); Peter J. Riga, The
Nature of Truth and Dissent, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 76 (1995) (“How can we teach law stu-
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of adversarial ethics for failing to account consciously and adequately
34
for objective truth and justice. And Professor Kronman criticizes the
training lawyers receive in the technique of advocacy for encouraging
“a kind of cynicism” regarding lawyers’ efforts to access the objective
35
truth of a dispute. Even Professor Markovits, who eschews advocacy’s
truth-seeking function, describes advocacy as requiring lawyers to
suppress their “correctly” and “properly” held views in favor of their
36
clients’ views. This characterization assumes that lawyers have access
to “correct” and “proper” views in the first place.
The assumption that lawyers, judges, and jurors can access the ob37
jective truth of a litigated legal dispute is incorrect and unwarranted.
As an initial matter, and as Aristotle explains, uncertainty inheres in
38
any context of “practical knowledge”—any context of human affairs.
This uncertainty is heightened in the subset of human relationships
that deteriorate into litigation. Litigation signifies that the parties lack
a shared understanding of the facts and differ over proper application
of the law. The parties may agree on some facts—for example, who
owned a particular car, who completed the accounting, or who was
formally responsible for compliance measures—but, by definition,
they will disagree on others. Similarly, they may agree on some aspects of applicable law but will necessarily disagree on others.
The engagement of lawyers will not dissipate the disagreement or
clarify the objective truth of a dispute. At the outset, a lawyer receives
dents to be morally sensitive to the truth as the highest value in the law and the legal
system? . . . Too often truth is secondary to procedure, to winning, to partisanship.”);
see also infra notes 34-37 (discussing the pursuit of objective truth in litigation).
34
See SIMON, supra note 4, at 138 (arguing that “[l]awyers should take actions
that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to
promote justice”).
35
Kronman, supra note 14, at 964.
36
MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 3-4.
37
We do not dispute that there are such things as “true”—or at least undisputed—
facts in human relationships, recognized by lawyers as well as everyone else. For example, George Washington was the first United States President and Barack Obama
the most recent. Moreover, we recognize the notion of “true truth”—if understood as
a sense of reality shared within a community—to be the foundation of noncontentious
human relationships. But the role of the forensic advocate is inapposite to situations
of social harmony. The forensic advocate engages in a very limited subset of human
interactions that involve legal disputes, where the parties may agree upon some facts
and norms but by definition do not agree on others.
38
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. I, ch. 3, at 1094b (arguing that just as precision
is difficult to achieve in “manufactured articles,” so, too, is precision difficult to achieve
in the search for knowledge); see also DUNNE, supra note 21, at 255 (“[E]lements of opportunity and luck . . . form a kind of penumbra around the clear light of rationality
that the Socratic philosophers were trying to reveal.”).
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only one side of the story, one version of the truth. It is a version that
is filtered through a client’s imperfect perceptions, biases, and recollections, but that will nevertheless condition the lawyer’s understanding of the case going forward. This version will shape the mental
framework through which the lawyer approaches the representation,
the issues upon which she focuses, and the questions that she asks her
clients and others.
As litigation progresses, a lawyer’s initial impressions and understandings will frequently be complicated rather than clarified.
Clients’ memories will change under the force of additional informa39
tion. Verbalizations of the event will displace raw recollection and
40
will become a part of the remembered experience itself. Opposing
counsel, meanwhile, will offer additional versions of the truth. Ultimately, there may be as many accounts of the underlying matter as
there were participants. As we have noted elsewhere, individuals
“have different understandings of what is happening in a transaction,
different subsequent retrospections of what happened, and different
interpretations of the significance of the event for their continuing
41
lives.” Allegations, discovery, and disclosures may reduce discrepancies along some lines but will surely compound them along others.
Amid this uncertainty, lawyers will continually work to understand
the facts that appear most likely true or at least “approximately” true.
But the limits of human capacity still bind them, and they cannot be
expected to discern an objective truth of the dispute.
Nor can members of the tribunal be expected to discern objective
truth, notwithstanding their official responsibility to resolve the dispute. By design, judges and jurors have limited access to first-hand
knowledge of the underlying matter. Those who have personal know-

39

See MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY 118 (1995) (“‘In remembering . . .
people not only distort and interpret information from the past so as to make it fit what
they know or believe in the present; they seem to add new information. The more distant the event, the more material the mind adds.’” (quoting JEREMY CAMPBELL, THE IMPROBABLE MACHINE 238 (1989))); James Lang, Note, Hearsay and Relevancy Obstacles to
the Admission of Composite Sketches in Criminal Trials, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1136 n.189
(1984) (noting the assumption that observers of crimes will more accurately recall an
event than will victims).
40
See Lang, supra note 39, at 1116 n.89 (“Additionally, research has shown that
during the course of the composite process the eyewitnesses’ original recollection may
be altered as replicated constructions are made.”).
41
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 1047 (1997).
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42

ledge are disqualified from participating. Advocates who could be
43
witnesses are generally disqualified as well. The resulting distance between members of the tribunal and the events in question is designed
to ensure objective, unbiased viewpoints. But the distance allows for
significant distortion of the information that ultimately reaches the tribunal. This information necessarily comes through the accounts of
44
participants who are available and willing to testify. These accounts
are filtered first through the witnesses’ imperfect perceptions and recollections and then through the factfinder’s evaluation of the wit45
nesses’ credibility and reliability. Moreover, the admissibility of testimony and other forms of evidence is subject to constitutional doctrines
and rules of evidence that sometimes prioritize the value of privacy
over that of truthfulness. Examples include the exclusionary rule,
which excludes otherwise relevant evidence that was obtained through
46
an illegal search, and evidentiary privileges, which allow individuals in
47
certain confidential relationships to refuse to testify.
42

See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 850, 867-68
(1988) (upholding a decision that the “appearance of impropriety” is sufficient to disqualify a judge who sat on the Board of Trustees of a party with interest in the litigation’s outcome); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 815-19, 823-24 (1986)
(holding that an Alabama Supreme Court justice who sued an insurance company
should have been disqualified from participating in a case against another insurer, the
outcome of which would possibly affect the justice’s case); Kirk v. Raymark Indus., 61
F.3d 147, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to strike for cause jurors with preexisting biases against one party).
43
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2009) (noting that, absent
specific exceptions, a lawyer should not advocate in a trial where it is expected that she
will be called as a witness); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 108(1)(a)–(b) (2000) (requiring lawyers who are “expected to testify” or whose “testimony would be material to establishing a claim or defense of the client” to refrain
from participating in the proceedings, with some exceptions).
44
See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial
Fact-Finding—Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW & PHIL. 497, 504
(1999) (noting the limitations on available testimony and evidence imposed by the
necessarily limited time frame of factfinding).
45
See, e.g., Kenneth Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High
Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004) (“[H]igh levels of
stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as accuracy of
recall of crime-related details.”); Peter J. van Koppen & Shara K. Lochun, Portraying
Perpetrators: The Validity of Offender Descriptions by Witnesses, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 661,
677 (1997) (finding that witnesses tend to identify “general” offender characteristics
correctly but give “vague” descriptions overall).
46
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
47
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (discussing various privileges); see also Summers, supra note 44, at 501 (discussing the spousal privilege). These
evidentiary doctrines may impede the tribunal’s efforts to discern truth, but they are
thought to be justified by other, superseding values and policies.
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On the basis of available and admissible evidence, jurors and
judges piece together an understanding of the dispute that they be48
lieve is most likely true. They determine whether a conclusion that
something did or did not happen is supported by the relevant standard of proof, be it preponderance of the evidence, clear and con49
vincing evidence, or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Because
of these different standards, the same evidence could lead to a finding
50
of truthful fact in one case but not in another.
In making these determinations, both jurors and judges strive to
be objective in the sense of being disinterested. Jurors, as amateurs,
may even view their job as finding objective truth. But the tribunal’s
51
determination of truth is never certain and absolute. It is only “approximate,” and this “approximate” truth is the basis on which the tribunal reaches judgment.
Just as in the law courts and deliberative assembly of ancient
Athens, reaching judgment in our legal system is therefore constrained by unavoidable uncertainty. Also, as in its ancient context,
our legal system requires reaching judgment as a matter of social necessity. Our judicial system exists, after all, to resolve disputes be-

As a result of the operation of this rule excluding evidence, the court may, in
the end, fail to find the true facts. . . . But such resulting divergence between
formal findings of fact and substantive truth can still be justified on policy or
other grounds. It is simply not so that the exclusive business of a trial court in
all disputed cases is to find the actual truth.
Summers, supra note 44, at 499-500.
48
See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 221 (1999) (defending the legitimacy of the trial by reference to its potential to “reveal, or at least converge on, the
truth of a human action”).
49
Jurors are even instructed that
[u]nless and until outweighed by evidence to the contrary, [they] may find
that official duty has been regularly performed, that private transactions have
been fair and regular, that the ordinary course of business of employment has
been followed, that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life, and that the law has been obeyed.
3 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL
§ 104.21 (5th ed. 2000).
50
See Summers, supra note 44, at 506 (“[T]ruth varies with standards of proof, and
standards of proof vary with what is at stake.”). Facts against an accused in a criminal
trial must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, while facts in a civil case must generally be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In certain civil cases where
the stakes are higher, such as where punitive damages may be awarded, courts may require facts against the defendant to be established by clear and convincing evidence.
51
See id. at 505 (noting “the risk of divergence between formal legal truth and
substantive truth” emerging from a trial proceeding).
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tween parties who cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution
themselves. As we will demonstrate in the next Section, the resulting
challenges—the challenges of arriving at judgment on the basis of
“approximate,” rather than objective, truth—justify the means and
explain the ends of rhetoric in ancient Athens and of advocacy in our
own litigation system.
B. Evaluating Advocacy in Context
1. Ancient Athens
Aristotle elaborates on the techniques of rhetoric through a comparison with the techniques of dialectic. He explains that while both
rely on logical argument, rhetoric alone relies on two additional
means of persuasion: the audience’s perception of the speaker’s character and the audience’s emotional response to the speaker’s content
52
and delivery. Without an appreciation of rhetoric’s social context,
one might view these additional elements of persuasion as manipulative and improper. With such an appreciation, however, one can see
how these elements emerge as important aspects of rhetoric’s response to the task that the advocate and the tribunal confront. They
are important ways in which a speaker helps an audience make a decision and take action in the absence of certain and objective truth.
Aristotle begins his comparison of the two forms of discourse by
recognizing a similarity between the “demonstration” of dialectic and
the practical conclusion of rhetoric. Both forms of analysis have a pa53
rallel logic, proceeding by major premise, minor premise, and conclusion (deduction), or by reaching a conclusion through examples
54
(induction). The parallel structure follows. Dialectic involves syllogism, which relies on deductive reasoning, and induction, which relies
55
on inductive reasoning. Rhetoric involves enthymeme, which relies
on deductive reasoning, and example, which relies on inductive rea56
soning. This parallel structure is the basis of Aristotle’s assertion that

52

See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356b (“[J]ust as in dialectic there
is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is
in rhetoric.”).
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
53
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rhetoric is not a mere “knack” in emotional manipulation, as Plato
57
58
had suggested. It is a proper art—“the counterpart of [d]ialectic.”
Beyond parallel logical structure, the two forms of analysis diverge. Aristotle explains that dialectic pursues the objective truth of a
“demonstration” under no time pressure or compulsion to reach a
conclusion. It does so in a purely intellectual and disinterested man59
ner, proceeding through logical argument alone.
Rhetoric, in contrast, pursues action and decision in response to
a pressing practical problem. As a result, Aristotle explains, it cannot
rely solely on the logically or deontologically “correct” arguments
60
that are appropriate for dialectic. The certainty of mind that carries
a person beyond contemplation and into action results from en61
gagement of the “whole” person, not just the intellect. To inspire
action, therefore, rhetoric must engage and appeal to all aspects of
57

See id. ch. 1, at 1354a (arguing that “framers of the current treatises on rhetoric”
have not fully considered the effort needed to acquire rhetorical skill); see also supra
note 14 (discussing Plato’s criticism of rhetoric).
58
ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1354a; see also William M.A. Grimaldi,
Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (noting that Aristotle views rhetoric’s role as
presenting dialectic to a listener “in such a way as to make accessible to the other the
possibility of reasonable judgment”), in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC
15, 16-17 (Richard Leo Enos & Lois Peters Agnew eds., 1998).
59
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a–b (discussing the differences
between rhetoric and dialectic).
60
See id. at 1355a (“For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there
are people whom one cannot instruct.”); see also MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discussing how lawyers employ tactics that may not adhere exactly to ethical rules but that are
necessary to exploit advantages that their clients may hold in an adversarial proceeding).
61
In De Anima, Aristotle refers to the emotional component of mental process as
“appetite,” distinguishing it from reason and suggesting its energetic or impulsive character. ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA bk. III, ch. 9, at 433a (R.D. Hicks trans., Cambridge ed.
1907). Various philosophers have subsequently and repeatedly affirmed this insight—
that human action, as opposed to passive contemplation, requires more than purely
intellectual mental processes. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
bk. I, pt. IV, § V, at 238-39 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978)
(1739) (positing that while the utility of alternative actions can be evaluated through
reason, decision among alternatives requires an act of the “passions”); FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER bk. II, § 142, at 91-92 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (referring to the mental
processes that carry a person into action as “the will to power”); BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, THE ETHICS pt. III, prop. 7 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed. & trans., Everyman Classics 1989)
(1677) (referring to this element of mental processes as “conatus”). Modern brain research supports, and to some extent explains, the phenomena that these philosophers
identified. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND
THE HUMAN BRAIN, at xi-xiii, 36-51 (1994) (concluding that the brain functions differently and implicates distinct mental processes in bringing forth the psychological certitude necessary for action, as opposed to passive thought).

HAZARD & REMUS SECOND REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

766

2/11/2011 1:10 PM

[Vol. 159: 751

the audience’s thought processes. Aristotle explains that it does so
through three distinct forms of persuasion: logical argument (logos),
the character of the speaker (ethos), and emotional appeal to the au62
dience (pathos).
Aristotle recognizes that rhetoric’s emotional appeal risks danger63
ous distraction. But he explains that the danger can be avoided if
the emotional appeal—pathos—is properly employed with and con64
strained by the other elements of persuasion—logos and ethos. When
a speaker employs the three elements together, rhetoric engages, but
65
does not dominate, the audience’s emotions.
As for the proper balance between these three elements of persuasion, Aristotle explains that it varies by context. It depends on the
matter to be resolved and the audience to be persuaded. For example, a judge or jury determining the guilt or innocence of an accused
will not be personally invested in the outcome of a decision and may
therefore be less likely to detect and guard against inappropriate emotional appeal than will members of a legislative body, who will be personally affected by their decisions regarding public policy issues.
Based on these observations, Aristotle concludes that rules prohibiting
improper emotional tactics are highly desirable in court, but unneces66
sary in the assembly.
Aristotle recognizes that there are ethical issues in the practice of
rhetoric, but he locates them outside of the core act of persuasion.
Emphasizing that it is a speaker’s use of rhetoric in particular ways
67
and to particular ends that determines its ethical character, he explains that rhetoric can, but must not, be used “[to] make people be68
lieve what is wrong.” He further explains that rhetoric’s possible
62

ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356a. Aristotle explains that “before
some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for
what we say to produce conviction,” id. ch. 1, at 1355a, because purely intellectual argument, no matter how “exact” and “correct,” is insufficient to inspire decisionmaking
and action.
63
See id. at 1354a (analogizing the dangers of appealing to the emotions of judges
to “warp[ing] a carpenter’s rule before using it”).
64
See id. ch. 2, at 1356a (describing the “three means of effecting persuasion” and
the critical role of each).
65
Id.
66
See id. ch. 1, at 1355a .
67
This is surely correct. It would not be unethical to persuade a child to dress
warmly after hearing a threatening weather report or to clear a building upon a credible threat of fire. But it could be unethical to persuade someone to clear a crowded
building for false or exploitative reasons.
68
ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch.1, at 1355a.
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abuse is no argument against its proper use. After all, many “things
that are most useful” offer great benefit when used properly, but
70
great harm when not.
2. Our Litigation System
Aristotle’s insights form the basis of a sound understanding of forensic advocacy in our contemporary legal system. They also provide
an effective response to critics who condemn advocacy as paying insufficient respect to the goal and value of truth. To develop this point, we
examine the role and function of the lawyer-advocate in its contemporary social context—more specifically, in addressing the challenges of
“practical knowledge” and “approximate truth” inherent in the litigation process. We begin at a preliminary stage, prior to the involvement
of lawyers, when individuals experience and understand an event as
real and as wrong. In the useful formula of Professors Felstiner, Abel,
and Sarat, individuals engage in “naming” (verbalizing the event),
“blaming” (subjectively fixing responsibility on some person or institution), and then “claiming” (asserting that someone else is legally re71
sponsible). In “claiming,” most individuals verbalize their grievances
72
in lay terminology. The affected individuals frequently incorporate
hearsay, irrelevancies, and what lawyers would label mere conclusions.
Would-be defendants respond in the first instance in similar fashion.
If the tribunal faced the daunting task of imposing order on these
lay accounts alone, administering justice would be a drawn-out and
paralyzing affair. As illustrated by the petitions of pro se litigants, lay
accounts hold little meaning in the language and categories of legal
73
thought and often remain legally incomprehensible. Without translation to the common language and standards of governing law, the
tribunal would have difficulty maintaining objectivity in comparing
74
and reconciling divergent accounts of the same event or transaction.

69

Id. at 1355b.
Id.
71
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635-36 (1980–81).
72
Id. at 647.
73
In Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), for example, the court discussed the difficulty that the pro se litigant would have winning his case without the
assistance of an attorney in formulating a legal claim. Id. at 775-76. As a result, many
federal courts have staff attorney positions devoted to pro se matters.
74
As discussed above, the nature of human perception and memory ensures that
the first-person accounts of various parties to a matter will diverge such that there will
70
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As Lon Fuller and John Randall explained decades ago in defending
the adversary system,
any arbiter who attempts to decide a dispute without the aid of partisan advocacy . . . must undertake, not only the role of judge, but
that of representative for both of the litigants. Each of these roles
must be played to the full without being muted by qualifications derived from the others. When he is developing for each side the
most effective statement of its case, the arbiter must put aside his
neutrality and permit himself to be moved by a sympathetic identification sufficiently intense to draw from his mind all that it is capable
of giving,—in analysis, patience and creative power. When he resumes his neutral position, he must be able to view with distrust the
fruits of this identification and be ready to reject the products of his
75
own best mental efforts.

Achieving objectivity in that context exceeds the limits of human capacity.
Generally, however, the tribunal does not confront its task alone.
76
Most individuals who pursue litigation engage an advocate, and the
advocate facilitates the process through which the tribunal reconciles
the conflicting accounts. The advocate does so by translating the
client’s first-hand account into a legal narrative that presents the tribunal with a view of how the “truth” of the matter appears from a particular perspective. The advocate acts as an arbitrageur—or learned
intermediary—between versions of truth. She receives one version
from the client and transmits another version, which holds greater val77
ue and meaning in legal currency, to other actors in the legal system.
The advocate accomplishes this translation by bringing to bear
empathy with both the client and the tribunal. Empathy with the
client allows the lawyer to offer the client confidence and strength for

likely be as many first-hand accounts of an event as there were participants. See supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
75
Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
76
Of course, exercises in “naming,” “blaming,” and “claiming” do not usually result in litigation, as many individuals lack connections, resources, or motivation to pursue their grievances.
77
Professor Markovits appears to agree with this position. See MARKOVITS, supra
note 1, at 188-93 (describing the effectiveness of transitioning language from that provided by the client to the new formulation of the lawyer); see also Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL
L. REV. 431, 457 (2010) (“[P]articipation in the legal process . . . fundamentally reconstitutes [disputants’ claims]. It does so by transforming brute demands into assertions of right . . . .”).
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78

the ordeal of litigation. It also allows the lawyer to comprehend and
internalize the client’s position and interests, so as to produce a narrative that is respectful of those interests. The narrative will not necessarily track the client’s account, however. In some cases, the value of
the narrative will lie in a departure from the client’s account. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case may recommend that a client assert
the privilege against self-incrimination, while the client would explain
and defend her conduct defiantly. A lawyer in a civil case may recommend that a client admit liability and contest only the issue of
damages, although the client considers herself free of any fault.
In addition to empathizing with the client, the advocate will also
empathize with the task and the perspective of the tribunal. This allows her to comprehend the relative persuasiveness of various presentations of the evidence and to construct a narrative that is most likely
to appear true to the judge and jury. In doing so, the advocate remains cognizant that a decision requires engagement of the “whole
79
person,” and not just the intellect. She also remains cognizant that
many cases, particularly those that reach a jury, are “rationally intrac80
table.” She therefore makes an emotional appeal that equates to
Aristotle’s pathos.
The advocate is not free, however, to construct any narrative that
might appeal to her audience’s emotional processes. Instead, she is
constrained by requirements that the narrative be based on a plausible version of the evidence and that it be informed by relevant substantive and procedural law. These are logical constraints that equate
to Aristotle’s logos. She is also constrained by the requirements of the
law governing lawyers and the norms of the legal profession. These
are ethical constraints that equate to Aristotle’s ethos. In this way, and
78

For a discussion that may apply to the interpersonal and sympathetic nature of
the attorney-client relationship, see Darien Shanske, Revitalizing Aristotle’s Doctrine of
Equity, 4 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 352 (2008). Shanske offers an insightful discussion of German philosopher Heidegger’s views on Rhetoric, applicable here. Id. at
364-73. Heidegger’s concept of “being” can be achieved, at least in part, through direct interpersonal relationships in which rhetoric is employed as a means of communication and through which a sense of community is achieved. Id. The attorney-client
relationship can be viewed as one such relationship.
79
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
80
Hazard, supra note 41, at 1053. Similarly, as Professor Jerome Michael suggested, “to say that I can decide an issue of fact reasonably either way is to say, I submit,
that I cannot, by the exercise of reason, decide the question. That means that the issue which we typically submit to juries is an issue which the jury cannot decide by the
exercise of its reason.” Jerome Michael, The Basic Rules of Pleading, 5 REC. OF THE ASS’N
OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 175, 199-200 (1950).
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just as Aristotle suggested, the three forms of rhetorical persuasion—
81
logos, ethos, and pathos—work together and constrain one another.
Informed by all three forms of persuasion, the advocate’s narrative will ease the tribunal’s burden in arriving at an accepted and authoritative truth of the dispute. In most cases, the parties will settle before trial, relieving the tribunal of this burden. But even in cases that
settle, the advocate constructs her legal narrative in anticipation of trial.
In cases that proceed to trial, the tribunal will consider the various
perspectives of conflicting narratives and will synthesize them into a
version that appears most likely and “approximately” true. In civil law
terminology, this legally constructed but politically authoritative ver82
sion of truth is called verita processuale—“procedural truth.” Procedural truth lacks the certainty of Aristotle’s theoretical truth, but it is
the authoritative basis for legal judgment. It is therefore pivotal to the
administration of justice in our legal system.
Many critics contend that in facilitating the construction of procedural truth, advocates show insufficient respect for objective truth.
These critics base their arguments on two realities of our legal system.
First, the law governing lawyers does not permit advocates to impose
83
their own views of truth and justice on their clients. As a result, critics argue, lawyers are impeded in any attempt to constrain seeming
perversions of the truth by their clients. Second, lawyers sometimes
employ rules of procedure and professional responsibility that prioritize values other than truthfulness, such as confidentiality and privacy
84
interests. We accept these realities, but we do not think that they
prove the critics’ conclusion that lawyers disrespect the truth. We
note that there are many ways in which an advocate can dissuade a
client from pursuing an obviously untrue story without reference to
the advocate’s own beliefs. She can, for example, explain to the client
81

Cf. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 73 (1999) (“The rules of the trial
are Plato’s revenge on the rhetoricians.”); James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 850 (1983) (“[T]he modern
lawyer and law teacher . . . in fact are rhetoricians very much as Plato defines them.”).
82
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS 76 (2004).
83
The principles of loyalty to the client and client control over the objectives of
representation preclude the lawyer from doing so. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.”). For discussion of this argument, see, for example,
MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 34.
84
The exclusionary rule and the evidentiary privileges, for example, prioritize privacy interests over truthfulness. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of evidentiary issues, see, for example, MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 51-52.
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that the story will conflict with those of other witnesses and will not
likely hold up on cross examination. And the procedural devices that
protect and advance interests other than the truth do not necessarily
express or reflect active resistance to the truth. Rather, they express a
recognition of the limitations imposed on a legal system that can administer only justice processuale.
Throughout the litigation process, advocates constantly and continually engage the truth of a matter, albeit an “approximate” version. Upon meeting a potential client, advocates evaluate the persuasiveness of the client’s account in order to determine whether to
accept or refuse the engagement. Under cover of attorney-client privilege, advocates assess their clients’ credibility and confront their
clients with difficulties or implausibilities in their stories. In discovery, advocates seek to unearth favorable evidence and take account of
adverse evidence. And throughout litigation, advocates continually
weigh the degree to which various pieces of evidence seem “approximately” true, both individually and in the aggregate. They remain
cognizant that undisputed truth generally signifies an end to litiga85
tion through settlement.
That advocates pursue and facilitate “approximate,” rather than
objective, truth does not reflect disrespect for the goal and value of
truthfulness. Rather, this process reflects acceptance of and engagement with the social contingency of a legal dispute. It also reflects acceptance of the limits of human knowledge and understanding—a
humility that expresses great respect for the nature and challenges of
truth in our litigation process.
If advocacy operated in a world of accessible and objective truth,
adversarial technique might sometimes, if not always, be characterized as unethical. As Aristotle recognizes, it is unethical to persuade
someone of that which is wrong, and in a world of easily accessible
objective truth, it would always be possible to determine what was
“wrong.” But our legal system does not have access to objective truth
and must resolve disputes on the basis of truths that are socially contingent and ultimately uncertain. When analyzed and evaluated in

85

While there are many reasons behind the high rate of settlement in our legal
system, recognition of and respect for undisputed truth is undoubtedly a significant
factor leading many parties to settle. Cf. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40
(1994) (discussing the difference between using the term “settle” to describe cases that
“do not go to trial” and to describe cases that are “resolved solely by agreement between the parties without any decision by an authoritative decisionmaker”).

HAZARD & REMUS SECOND REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

772

2/11/2011 1:10 PM

[Vol. 159: 751

this light, advocacy emerges as an ethically positive and valuable
means by which our legal system accesses truths that are persuasive
enough to facilitate judgment.
II. ETHICAL ADVOCACY IN THE REAL WORLD
We do not dispute that adversarial advocacy can be and sometimes is used in improper ways and to improper ends. In this Part, we
address two of the deep and prominent flaws in our legal system—
lawyer misconduct and unequal access to legal services. We argue,
however, that these are problems of practice that do not detract from
the ethically positive nature of advocacy’s core function. As a result,
they are not properly addressed through many critics’ proposals of
reconstituting the role of the advocate or the structure of our sys86
tem. Rather, they are properly addressed through extrinsic regulatory controls on practice, primarily in the form of the law governing
lawyers and the rules of evidence and procedure. Specific reform
proposals are outside of the scope of this Article and are a task for future work. Below, we lay the groundwork by noting a few proposals
deserving of extended study.
A. Lawyer Misconduct
Lawyer misconduct generally arises in two situations: where ethical rules are ambiguous and where enforcement is weak. The first
situation is common, given that many rules of practice are stated in
highly general terms. For example, the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes87
sional Conduct instruct that representation must be “competent,”
88
89
advice must be “candid,” and fees must not be “unreasonable.”
Even rules addressing more specific practice situations are often
stated in general terms. Examples include the rules prohibiting delay
90
for the sole purpose of disadvantaging an opponent, cross91
examination for the sole purpose of embarrassing a witness, and
92
abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
86

See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009).
88
Id. R. 2.1.
89
Id. R. 1.5.
90
Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1.
91
See id. R. 4.4(a) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass . . . a third person . . . .”).
92
Id. R. 3.8.
87

HAZARD & REMUS SECOND REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Advocacy Revalued

2/11/2011 1:10 PM

773

Formulating rules in general terms has advantages. It anticipates
application of the rules to a diverse range of practice situations and
93
offers desired flexibility. At the same time, however, such an ap94
proach creates problematic gaps in guidance. For example, the distinction between a reasonable and an unreasonable fee is clear only at
95
the extremes, leaving much room for questionable and undesirable
billing practices. The ambiguity is particularly stark, and particularly
problematic, in the case of rules requiring reporting of lawyer misconduct. Model Rule 8.3 requires lawyers to report incidents of misconduct of which they “know[]” and which “raise[] a substantial question as to [a] lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
96
other respects.” Because there is little consensus as to what level of
knowledge triggers the Rule’s application and what constitutes a re97
portable offense, few lawyers report peers’ questionable conduct.
The problem is exacerbated by the embittering and often ineffective
nature of the disciplinary process. The process leads many lawyers to
believe that reporting misconduct by other lawyers will do little but
98
harm their own reputations and relationships.
A second and equally pervasive situation in which misconduct
goes unaddressed is where enforcement is weak. As an initial matter,
few reports of misconduct ever reach the relevant disciplinary authori-

93

For a discussion of the tension between the advantages and disadvantages of
breadth and specificity in ethical rules, see Carol Rice Andrews, Highway 101: Lessons
in Legal Ethics that We Can Learn on the Road, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 110 (2001).
94
See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974 (1984) (theorizing that uncertainty of legal
outcomes may create an incentive structure that favors socially suboptimal behavior);
Sean Keveney, Note, The Dishonesty Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 81 TEX. L. REV. 381, 382
(2002) (noting that inconsistently applied rules of law fail to contribute to social order
and “invite[] the exercise of broad judicial discretion”).
95
Cf. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 159 (2000) (“What constitutes an ‘incompetent’ performance or ‘unreasonable’ fee is difficult to assess except at
the extremes, and lawyers usually have no incentive to gather the relevant information.”).
96
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2009).
97
See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 280-82 (2003) (discussing the ambiguity of Model Rule 8.3); Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Note, A Current Look at Model
Rule 8.3: How Is It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747,
749-54 (2003) (discussing reasons that lawyers are hesitant whistleblowers).
98
See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical
Analysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 176 (1999) (“Attorneys
are troubled by mandatory reporting requirements because of a general professional
ambivalence toward those who report others’ wrongdoing to appropriate authorities.”).
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99

ties. Lawyers rarely report each others’ misconduct. Judges are similarly reluctant to refer complaints to disciplinary authorities or to ex100
Clients, meanwhile, are
ercise inherent powers to sanction abuse.
101
an unreliable source of information regarding misconduct.
They
frequently associate an undesirable outcome with bad lawyering, failing to distinguish between the merits of a claim and the appropriateness of a lawyer’s conduct.
Of the small number of lawyer misconduct reports that reach the
relevant disciplinary bodies, an even smaller number results in disciplinary action. In 2002, approximately five percent of complaints were
found to “warrant formal charges,” and only four percent of com102
plaints led to some form of disciplinary action.
Further, in a large
proportion of complaints that resulted in disciplinary action, that action consisted only of private sanctions or reprimands; only twenty
percent of attorneys against whom formal charges were filed were dis103
barred as a result. Part of the problem is underfunding and understaffing of disciplinary agencies. Another part of the problem is excessively close ties between disciplinary agencies and the organized
bar, raising suspicions that disciplinary boards prioritize the profession’s interests over the public interest.
In the resulting gaps in guidance and enforcement, the possibility
of misconduct survives. And because of financial and other pressures

99

See Michael J. Burwick, You Dirty Rat!! Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory Reporting
of Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 143 (1994) (“[Model Rule 8.3] has
been viewed by the profession as a Pandora’s box which attorneys have been reluctant
to open.”).
100
In Golden Eagle Distributing Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation, 103 F.R.D. 124
(N.D. Cal. 1984), the district court found that when local counsel did not “active[ly]
participat[e] in the preparation or decision to file a paper” that led to Rule 11 sanctions for its authors, local counsel should not receive “sanctions other than criticism
for their apparent neglect.” Id. at 125 n.1. Morover, while this court did impose Rule
11 sanctions on the primary firm, such sanctions were later reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
101
See RHODE, supra note 95, at 159 (“Clients frequently lack sufficient information or incentives to file grievances.”); DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 264-65 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining
that clients are rarely motivated to “initiate disciplinary proceedings” due to the nature of the system).
102
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1142-43
(4th ed. 2005) (citing ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSBILITY, 2002 ABA SURVEY ON
LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (S.O.L.D.), at Chart I, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/discipline/sold/toc_2002.html (follow “Chart I” hyperlink)).
103
Id. at 1143 (citing ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSBILITY, supra note 102, at
Charts I and II).
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for persuasion at all costs, the possibility often becomes a probability.
But lawyer misconduct is neither inevitable nor preordained by the
structure of our legal system. If it were, we would expect misconduct
to be universal. But this is not the case. Many lawyers conduct themselves appropriately and ethically, even in our underenforced system.
Nevertheless, many critics argue that the only way to address the
problem of lawyer misconduct in our legal system is to reconstitute
105
the system and the constituent role of the advocate. They would do
so by shifting the relevant regulatory regime from one that relies on
extrinsic controls of lawyer conduct to one that relies on intrinsic
106
We find this approach misguided
conditioning of lawyers’ morals.
for a number of reasons.
First, if the critics’ causal assumption is incorrect—if the structure
of our system is not the root cause of problems in the practice of advocacy—adoption of their proposals would not remedy the problems
of lawyer misconduct and would arguably lead to more egregious
abuses. To the extent the critics would abandon extrinsic regulatory
controls in favor of intrinsic moral conditioning, adoption of their
proposals would eliminate an important check on blatant misconduct
and create an intolerable risk of abuse.
Second, the critics’ approach would jeopardize fundamental indi107
vidual rights and constitutional protections. It would qualify the duties of confidentiality and loyalty. This qualification, in turn, could interfere with clients’ fundamental interests in autonomy, dignity, and
privacy. In the criminal context, it could compromise the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and
108
the presumption of innocence.
104

Fee agreements often contribute to this problem.

That is one of the great disadvantages of our adversary system: fees are mostly
dependent on whether lawyers win or lose for their clients. This heavy emphasis on winning produces its own subtle corruption as they appeal to every
procedural trick to delay, discourage, hide, obfuscate, and finally destroy the
truth of the matter.
Peter J. Riga, The Nature of Truth and Dissent, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 75-76 (1995).
105
See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
106
Id.
107
See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2-3
(1975) (explaining the significance of the criminal defendant’s constitutionally protected liberties and the role of the defense attorney as protector of those liberties, even
when they conflict with the truth-seeking function of the trial).
108
As one of us has noted elsewhere:
The consequences of an alternative model are readily apparent in many totali-
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Third, adoption of the critics’ approach could decrease the perceived legitimacy of our legal system. Most litigants’ perceptions of
justice turn more on the opportunity to be heard in court pursuant to
fair and predictable procedures than on the substantive outcome of a
109
case. And to most litigants, representation by a loyal advocate is an
indispensable feature of a fair hearing.
Finally, in blaming the system for lawyer misconduct, critics who
propose an intrinsic moral solution ironically imply a lack of moral
agency among lawyers. Some lawyers undoubtedly hide behind professional obligations of zealous advocacy while engaging in questionable conduct. But scholarly accounts that accept this excuse give it unfortunate credence. Such accounts also fail to recognize the highly
complex nature of the moral agency of the advocate, accounting as it
does for the necessity of proceeding on the basis of available evidence
and approximate truth.
The critics’ approach diverts attention from what we believe to be
the proper focus of reform efforts—the extrinsic regulatory controls
of procedural rules, rules of evidence, and the law governing lawyers.
These controls seek to set the moral risk of the lawyer-advocate’s function at a socially accepted level by counterbalancing economic pressures on lawyer-advocates to engage in questionable or improper conduct. To the extent that lawyers are exhibiting the dishonesty and
deceit that critics allege, the current risk level may be too high. The
proper response, we would suggest, is sustained attention to specific
and incremental reform efforts. For purposes of illustration, we briefly note a few proposals regarding the law governing lawyers.

tarian countries that lack an adversarial process and an independent profession. Where defense lawyers’ role is to “serve justice,” rather than their
clients, what passes for “justice” often is simply deference to prosecutorial authority. . . . In the long run, providing adversarial protections for individuals
who are guilty also protects those who are not.
RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 101, at 57.
109
See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 64-67 (1988) (summarizing studies indicating that litigants evaluate legal outcomes based on whether they considered the proceedings to be fair). In large part, this
may be why certain arbitration programs have been highly successful. See, e.g., NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROGRAMS IN THE PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON
PLEAS: FINAL REPORT, at iv-v (2004), available at http://courts.phila.gov/pdf/report/
NSCS-Civil-Final-Report.pdf (outlining the success of Philadelphia’s compulsory arbitration program); see also COMPULSORY ARBITRATION CTR., CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AT A
GLANCE 2005-2006, at 1, http://courts.phila.gov/pdf/manuals/civil-trial/compulsoryarbitration-center.pdf (discussing Philadelphia’s arbitration process).
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With respect to the problem of ambiguous ethical rules that offer
insufficient guidance, one approach would be to give greater and
more detailed attention to specific fields of practice through standards of good practice. The American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel has issued the ACTEC Commentaries, which offer ethical
110
The American
guidance specific to trusts and estates practice.
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers has adopted similar standards for
111
family law practice. Alternatively, more context-specific guidance
could be given in the Rules of Professional Conduct. We have elsewhere proposed a revised, context-specific no-contact rule to replace
112
existing Model Rule 4.2. Following this approach, we could address
the critics’ central concern—that some lawyers seem to show insufficient respect for the truth—by offering rules of candor that give more
specific guidance in specific contexts.
With respect to the problem of ineffective enforcement—against,
for example, lawyers engaged in intentional malfeasance—one proposal, frequently advanced, would be to increase public reporting by
increasing public information regarding the disciplinary process and
the profession’s ethical standards. Some commentators have proposed establishing a clearinghouse of information regarding lawyers
that would include performance records, malpractice coverage, and
113
history of professional discipline. This approach, however, does not
110

AM. COLL. OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 2006).
111
Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys
and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings (with Commentary), 13 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1 (1995).
112
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana Remus Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2
No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 797 (2009). Model Rule 4.2 generally prohibits a
lawyer from “communicat[ing] about the subject of the representation with a person
the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009). We observed that proper application of this rule appears quite different in a criminal matter (for example, where a prosecutor inappropriately approaches a defendant who has invoked his constitutional right to counsel),
Hazard & Irwin, supra, at 816-18, than in a family matter (for example, where a lawyer
seeks to communicate directly and quickly with a represented spouse concerning a potential threat to his or her safety), id. at 829-30. Accordingly, we proposed a revised
rule that specified proper application in various contexts. Id. at 848-51. A similar
analysis applies to many other rules, and a potentially fruitful approach would be to
create context-specific standards.
113
See, e.g., RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 101, at 267 (advocating for “data banks
and toll-free hotlines that would provide information about judicial sanctions, disciplinary actions, and malpractice judgments”); Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time for Lawyer
Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 690 (2001) (“[E]ven if the time for lawyer profiles
isn’t this moment, that time should be coming relatively soon.”); cf. RHODE, supra note

HAZARD & REMUS SECOND REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

778

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

2/11/2011 1:10 PM

[Vol. 159: 751

address the central problem of client reporting, which is that relatively
few clients distinguish between the desirability of an outcome and the
appropriateness of a lawyer’s conduct. A better approach may be to
rely on independent government supervision and regulation of lawyer
conduct. Particularly in states where disciplinary authorities have
close ties to the organized bar, promising reforms would focus on in114
creasing both independence and accountability.
B. Unequal Access to Competent Legal Services
A second prominent difficulty with the practice of advocacy in our
legal system stems from unequal access to legal services. As Professor
Deborah Rhode has summarized:
Th[e] [conventional] model presupposes adversaries with roughly
equal incentives, resources, capabilities, and access to relevant information. But those conditions are more the exception than the
rule in a society that tolerates vast disparities in wealth, high litigation costs, and grossly inadequate access to legal assistance. . . . In
115
law, as in life, the haves generally come out ahead.

When opposing parties are represented by advocates of significantly divergent skill, that divergence may dictate the case’s outcome. As one of
us has commented elsewhere, “[t]he blunt truth is that some decisions
by the courts result from the fact that the advocate for one side was
more clever, more steadfast, more patient, more diligent, or simply had
116
Problems of divergent skill are
a better day than the opponent.”
compounded when opposing parties have unequal resources with
117
At one end of the spectrum are indiwhich to fund representation.
95, at 163 (concluding that the ABA’s rejection of a proposal for increased public disclosure of disciplinary complaints was motivated by lawyers’ self-interest).
114
See RHODE, supra note 95, at 162 (arguing that a commission under control of a
state’s supreme court but “independent of the organized bar” would help produce a
“regulatory structure more responsive to the public interest than the prevailing system”); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 11851204 (2003) (discussing the independence of state courts).
115
RHODE, supra note 95, at 55-56.
116
HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 82, at 69; see also Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for
the Pro Se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644
(1987) (recognizing that the adversarial system is prone to unfairness for those who do
not “assert effectively legal rights”).
117
See, e.g., Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 70-72 (2007) (citing statistics
showing that pro se litigants are far less likely to file motions, request discovery, receive
continuances, and raise substantive claims and defenses than are litigants represented
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vidual clients who cannot afford a lawyer at all. At the other end of the
spectrum are sophisticated and wealthy clients who have the resources
to “play for the rules.” It may be relatively rare that the opposing ends
of the spectrum meet in a single case, but it is not rare to find a signifi118
cant imbalance of power and resources between opposing litigants.
Similar to the problem of lawyer misconduct, unequal access to
legal services is not a challenge that originates within the structure of
119
our legal system. Rather, it is a product of power and wealth disparities that pervade society at large. Our legal system cannot resolve
these disparities, but it can mitigate their impact by increasing the
availability of low-or-no-cost legal services. One approach, supported
by many commentators, is to establish a right to counsel in civil cas120
Implementing such a right faces significant obstacles, however,
es.
such as funding and determining to which cases the right would ap121
More incremental approaches may therefore be more realistic
ply.
and effective. Legal services could be unbundled so that lawyers could
122
offer targeted, limited representation, or unauthorized practice of
by lawyers); Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 503, 506 (1998) (arguing in favor of a right to counsel “whenever access to
the justice system is warranted” because of the high costs to society of unfair proceedings stemming from unequal representation).
118
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing the advantages enjoyed
by “repeat players”).
119
Cf. MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 201 n.*, 202-03 (arguing that eliminating partisanship advocacy would be an ineffective response to the problems of unequal distribution of legal services).
120
See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 379-80, 380 n.83 (2005) (citing commentators who have
made this argument); Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States’ Failure to
Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 317, 318 (2001) (arguing
that the United States should “follow the lead” of other industrialized societies that are
more protective of the right to counsel).
121
Proponents respond that these problems of implementation should not be
deemed fatal. They note that the same problems have been overcome in the criminal
context, and they argue that there is often as much at stake in civil cases as in criminal
cases. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 117, at 73 (suggesting that civil matters, such as
homelessness from eviction or loss of custody of a child, may present greater stakes for
the indigent civil litigant than for the criminal defendant). Proponents also reference
successful implementation of a right to counsel in civil cases in other countries, including England, Canada, and Australia. See Ritchey, supra note 120, at 331-36 (citing sixteen countries that provide attorneys for indigent civil litigants and discussing the implementations of such systems in England, Germany, and Switzerland).
122
Given the number of young lawyers admitted to the bar each year notwithstanding the already saturated nature of the legal services marketplace, many lawyers
would likely be willing to offer unbundled and comparatively inexpensive legal servic-
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law rules could be relaxed so that paralegals and other nonlawyer professionals could offer specific, limited services. Low-cost legal services
could be delivered at walk-in legal clinics, much as low-cost health ser123
vices are delivered at walk-in medical clinics. Other promising proposals include increasing the availability of free legal information re124
sources and encouraging reliance on arbitration proceedings as a
125
lower-cost alternative to traditional litigation.
Proposals such as
these, which target specific problems of practice, deserve and demand
sustained attention and consideration.
CONCLUSION
We have defended our system of adversarial advocacy not as capable of discovering objective truth, but as capable of constructing legi126
timate and authoritatively accepted truth. We have defended good
lawyers—those who are effective and ethical—as playing a critical role

es. See, e.g., Mark Greenbaum, Op-Ed., No More Room at the Bench, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2010, at A27, available at 2010 WLNR 388882 (admonishing the ABA for failing to
“properly regulate” law schools and advocating government intervention to ease the
oversaturation within the legal profession); Gerry Shih, Downturn Dims Prospects Even at
Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at B1 (discussing the difficult job market
for law school graduates).
123
In fact, low-cost legal clinics are already being organized in this fashion. For
spirited commentary on this development, see, for example, Elie Mystal, The Wal-Mart
of Law Firms Might Be Wal-Mart, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 16, 2009, 4:12 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/11/the-wal-mart-of-law-firms-might-be-wal-mart. Other
similar solutions that have been implemented include a coffee shop where drop-ins
can seek legal advice. See LEGAL GRIND, http://www.legalgrind.com (last visited Nov.
15, 2010).
124
Many efforts have been made to make legal information resources more freely
available, which could lead to a substantial reduction in the cost of legal services. Traditionally, Westlaw and Lexis were the only available online databases, both very expensive.
Now, there are several free alternatives, including Google Scholar,
http://scholar.google.com/advanced_scholar_search (last visited Nov.. 15, 2010); Cornell University Law School’s Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010); various court and agency websites, such as the website of
the Third Judicial Circuit, which includes an opinion archive, http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/indexsearch/archives.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); and various
other free legal information websites, including BitLaw, http://www.bitlaw.com (last
visited Nov. 15, 2010); FindLaw, http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Nov.15, 2010);
and Justia, http://www.Justia.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
125
See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, supra note 111, at 18 (encouraging settlement through mediation or other alternatives to avoid “acrimonious” family
law disputes).
126
Professor Markovits appropriately points out that production of an authoritative version of the truth, in turn, can give rise to political legitimacy. MARKOVITS, supra
note 1, at 171-211.
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in this process. We acknowledge that, as implemented, our adversarial system has numerous flaws, and, as practiced, advocacy can be
abused. But we argue that these evils lie in the practice, and not the
core function, of adversarial advocacy.
Addressing the practice of rhetoric in ancient Athens, Aristotle
commented that it could be used for good or evil, but that its poten127
tial for abuse was no reason to condemn its proper use. In evaluating the role of advocacy in our contemporary legal system, we might
heed the wisdom of the ancients.

127

ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355b.

